Bengali Kitchen Glossary

Ever read a recipe you felt like trying but some words just don’t make sense e.g. Fenugreek or Asafoetida? Here’s your ready reference. Treat this as a dictionary for all your Bengali Culinary words.

Here you go!

Vegetables and Legumes

English Name

Bengali Name


Noyte shaakh

নটে শাখ

Apple Gourd



Ash Gourd

Chal Kumro

চাল কুমড়ো




Bitter Gourd



Bitter melon/Bitter gourd



Black-eyed pea



Bottle Gourd/ Calabash



Broad Beans



Brussels sprout

Biliti Bandhakopi

বিলিতি বাধাকপি


Badha Kopi









Pathuni Shaakh

পাথুনি শাখ

Ceylon spinach

Pui Shaakh

পুঁই শাখ




Cilantro/ Coriander

Dhane Pata

ধনে পাতা





Sajner Data

সজনের ডাটা




Elephant Foot yam



French Beans




Kabuli Chola

কাবুলি ছোলা




Indian pea



Ivy Gourd/ Gentlemen’s Toe/Little Gourd






Kidney bean






Lotus root


পদ্ম শাখ

Malabar Spinach

Pui Shaakh

পুঁই শাখ


Pudina Pata

পুদিনা পাতা

Moth bean

Mung dal

মুগ ডাল






ভিন্দী/ ঢেরস







Pigeon pea

Arhar Dal

অরহর ডাল

Pointed Gourd












Red Amaranth

Lal shaakh

লাল শাখ

Red Lentil

Masur Dal

মুসুর ডাল

Ridge Gourd/ Chinese Okra



Snake Gourd






Spring Onion/Scallion



String Beans



Sweet corn aka corn; aka maize



Sweet Potato or Kumara

Mishti Alu

মিষ্টি আলু


Kochur Loti


Teasle Gourd









Turnip greens



Water spinach



Winter melon

Chal Kumro

চাল কুমড়ো





English Name

Bengali Name


Kebab chini

কাবাব চিনি




Bay Leaf

Tej Pata

তেজ পাতা

Black Cardamom

Bauro Elaich

বড় এলাচ

Black Cumin

Kalo Zeera

কালো জিরা

Black Pepper

Gol Morich

গোল মরিচ

Black Salt

Kalo Noone

কালো নুন

Brown Mustard Seed

Choto sarse/ Rai

ছোট সর্ষে/রাই

Caraway Seeds

Shahi Zeera

শাহ জিরা


Joane/ Ajwain


















Jeera/ Zeera











Fenugreek Leaf

Kasuri Methi

কাসুরি মেথি







Green Cardamom

Choto Elaich

ছোট এলাচ

Holy Basil















Poppy Seeds







Laban/ Noone

লবন/ নুন

Sour Mango Powder



Spice Mixture

Garam Masala

গরম মসলা

Star Anise

Chakro Phool

চক্র ফুল

Star Anise









Did we miss anything? Let us know in the comments.

Politics in Heaven

Paradise Lost, Milton’s vast and highly influential epic poem, offers a unique conception of both politics and theology. Controversial and subversive, the text fails to deliver a concrete argument about the nature of divine justice, and the role of theology in the political. Nevertheless, Milton suggests that the ordering of power and influence on earth, in Hell, or in any part of Milton’s universe, is within God’s hands. A corrupt regime, be it a republic or monarch, is one which seeks to overextend its appropriate place in the natural order (of which God is supreme ruler). Proper politics are those which fit into a proper theological order. The theology of Milton, into which his politics are integrated, is not one of blind submission or of compulsion, but it is founded upon the supreme importance of freedom. The ability of humanity to choose is the foundation, for Milton, of all political justice. According to Paradise Lost, it is appropriate to question God’s will and justice, as reason is the foundational principle of freedom. In order to understand the intricate connection Milton weaves between theology and politics, one must examine the nature of his theology and the various manifestations of freedom in Paradise Lost. Various scholars have examined the unique connection Milton draws between his narrative of fallen angels and humans and the political regimes of his day. Many have questioned the orthodoxy of his theology, and his political loyalties, but regardless of where Milton stood on particular issues, it is evident that his conception of politics is based in a singular and powerful theology, and that his version of scriptural retelling is heavily influenced by the political climate of 17th century England. Paradise Lost blatantly invokes the political. It is filled with references to political institutions which reveal facets of Milton’s argument. These allusions, placed as they are in a fundamentally theological work, draw the readers’ attention to an important relationship between theology and politics. Milton creates a parallel between the relationship of God to humankind, and earthly manifestations of political authority. Much of the narrative depends on the political framework of God as the “world’s great Author” (Milton 5.188), and the rest of Creation as his kingdom.
Readings of Milton have traditionally been divided between those who view his
work as orthodox, and those who see it as heretical. The latter emphasize the
unconventional and potentially sympathetic treatment of the character Satan as
evidence of his heretical views. Certain scholars suggest that Milton’s work is a radical declaration of revolution against tyranny, and that God is portrayed as a tyrant to Satan’s republican. Others, however, argue that Milton maintains an orthodox Christian perspective and that he acted as a spokesperson for the classical understanding of God’s relation to man and the nature of the Fall. For many scholars, there is a “question of consonance between” Milton’s political and theological tracts and his Paradise Lost (Lewalski 143). Miltonists who find Paradise Lost to be a grand embodiment of Christian orthodoxy have always sought to distance it on some grounds from the heterodoxies of Christian Doctrine. Other Milton scholars find the late poems to be imbued with those heterodoxies–antitrinitarianism, arminianism, monism–and find them central to the poem’s drama and power (144).
Regardless of Milton’s orthodoxy, his argument is based on the fundamental importance of freedom. For Milton, the relationship between metaphysics and the political is defined by liberty, and one’s place within the system. Myers identifies the source of dissension and mixed opinions of the nature of Milton’s theology as the poem itself, which is “altogether more complex, more variegated and more elusive than either straightforward orthodox or straightforwardly heretical readings have tended to suggest” (4). It is through an original account of theology that Milton explores the nature of freedom, politics and metaphysics. This both complicates and illuminates his version of the Fall, and his characterization of God, Satan, and the Son. Milton’s account of freedom, and its subsequent impact on the nature of politics, must be understood within the context of this original theology, in which God is neither an uncontroversial benefactor, nor a single-minded tyrant. As McColley writes, Milton’s poetry “is too open and subtle to become trapped in an ideology” (34).
The very construction and declared intent of the poem, “to justify the ways of God to man” (1.26), suggests something inherently troubling in the nature of God’s actions such that they need to be justified. Milton, from the beginning of the poem, indicates that it is appropriate to question the justice of a divine monarchy. Milton begins with the persuasive rhetoric of fallen angels. He creates a telling of the familiar biblical story that is far more nuanced, in which evil is portrayed as a complex reality which can both repel and allure readers (Diekhoff 54). The structure of the poem ensures that God’s goodness cannot be supposed (82). Milton gives heredoxical and subversive viewpoints a mouthpiece in his poem, but ultimately asserts the goodness and justice of God’s rule: “Satan helps us to know God, through a series of marvelously engineered inversions” (Kranidas 129). The final state of the fallen angels in Book 10 indicates that God’s hand is in all things, and that he is ultimately the “restorer of mankind” (10.646).
The second version of divine rule is offered by God Himself, and it is in sharp contrast to the account of Satan, Moloch, and the other fallen angels. In Book 3, God claims that humans are “authors to themselves in all / Both what they judge and what they choose; for so / I formed them free, and free they must remain, / Til they enthrall themselves” (3.122-5). He explains that punishment is not directly from His hand, but that one creates and wills its own retribution. “Reprobation is therefore not an act of the divine will, but an act of the human will” (Kranidas 85). Some scholars argue that freedom is a mechanism of the Father’s power, “a political tool for creating obedience rather than a theological premise in a syllogism to prove God’s goodness” (Dunnum 153), one which “exerts power through an ideology of obedience” (152). Yet Milton ultimately argues for the intrinsic justice of self-discipline. Abdiel says in Book 6 that for one to rebel “against his worthier” is to serve oneself, and “thyself not free, but to thyself enthralled” (Milton 6.179-81). “God establishes an internal mechanism, personified as an ‘Umpire Conscience’, which will aid mankind in maintaining ‘obedience’ as the ultimate aim of existence” (Armstrong 95). The freedom to stand or fall requires the willpower and integrity of God’s subjects, but it is premised on his grace. The definition of freedom Milton proposes depends upon a larger structure of obedience and the hierarchy of which God is head (Dunnum 154). In submission to God’s higher power, one is free to choose her own prosperity.
Freedom is the crucial question for Milton. For him, it is ultimately considered a moral act (Savage 286). According to some scholars, the freedom of God is of primary importance; “it is the ground and basis of all creaturely freedom” (Myers 93). God, the supreme being, “is free to create or not and free to redeem or not” (93). Made in the image of their creator, humans are likewise given freedom of will and action. In Paradise Lost, we are given to believe that the actions of intelligent beings, whether angels or men, are freely willed, neither constrained nor compelled…Their actions are always considered to be those of moral agents, free to have chosen differently, responsible for what they have chosen, and deserving of whatever praise or blame their actions may justly merit (Savage 288).
The matter of free will, however, is more complicated than this, as there is the issue of causation. Milton identifies another part of his intent to: “say first what cause / Moved our grand parents in that happy state, / Favoured of Heaven so highly to fall off / From their Creator and transgress his will” (Milton 1.28-31). Milton is preoccupied with culpability; he questions who is responsible for humanity’s fallen nature, and the implications this has on the integrity of God. When one questions what caused the fall, one assumes that it was inevitable. But, if it was freely willed, without constraints of any sort, there is the potential that it was avoidable. This complication forces us to simultaneously attribute the fall to free will, and to believe in its necessity. To assume that Adam could have chosen differently, that there was no cause, is to suggest spontaneity, but also to imply that his actions had no purpose and were completely left to chance (Savage, 290). Satan makes the argument that God, in concealing the extent of his strength, “tempted [the angels’] attempt and wrought our fall” (Milton 1.642). This tension reveals a crucial component of Milton’s theology and politics: one is only free insofar as she fills her proper place in Creation. A human is “free in proportion to his fulfillment of what God has intended for him” (Savage 219). According to Milton, freedom is action in harmony with God’s will.
For Adam, it is his awareness of what he ought to do which initially implies his freedom…That he feels himself morally obligated to act in a certain way is sufficient to his freedom to do so, for he cannot feel obligated to do that which he in fact is not at liberty to do (Savage 292). Humans must, in both theology and politics, have the freedom to choose or reject rule. This allows for the possibility that humanity and individuals may choose wrongly; but, for Milton–to whom freedom is of utmost importance–just and sustainable systems are built on the principle of free will. As Hooker puts it, freedom is “to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good” (170). For Milton, the eternal and infinite justice of God’s plan is in this liberty: “the free human will, a will that decrees the future and authors its own fate” within the confines of Providence (Kranidas 92).
Reason dictates the degree to which one fulfills God’s purpose. For Milton, freedom is only available to the rational (293), as one must know and will the good. A person’s freedom is proportionate to her rationality, and she is only rational insofar as she chooses God’s will–which is intrinsically good. Adam’s defense of God’s ways in Book 9 is based on this premise, that “God left free the will, for what obeys / Reason, is free, and reason he made right” (Milton 9.351-2). Adam argues that all happiness is found in obedience to God, because of God’s perfection. Creation, Adam posits, wasmade in accordance with God’s will, governed by the rational; therefore, all who dwell within the will of God dwell also in his reason.
The implications of this argument extend beyond the individual and into the political realm. Milton criticizes the institution of absolute monarchy, insofar as there is no room for free will. He does not, however, advocate for the absolute virtue of a republican state. Rather, he argues that the system itself, regardless of the particularities of the court, must be based on the principle of free will. The primary issue with monarchies is that they misplace and misuse authority. In A Treatise of Civil Power In Ecclesiastical Causes, Milton argues that “it is not lawful for any power on earth to compel in matters of religion”. In Book 12 of Paradise Lost, Raphael warns Adam of rulers who
seek to avail themselves of names,
Places and titles, and with these to join
Secular power, though feigning still to act
By spiritual, to themselves appropriating
The Spirit of God, promised alike and giv’n
To all believers; and from that pretence,
Spiritual laws by carnal powers shall force
on every conscience…
What will they then
But force the Spirit of grace itself, and bind
His consort Liberty (12.515-526).
Man is free to rule the beasts, fish and fowl, “but man over men / He made not lord; such title to himself / Reserving, human left from human free” (12. 69-72). Those who usurp God’s authority over others, or who “claim second sov’reignty” (35), reject both reason and liberty, the foundational principles of God’s creation. According to Milton, lack of reason produces tyranny. Such a ruler, “since he permits / Within himself unworthy powers to reign / Over free reason, God in judgement just / Subjects him from without to violent lords” (90-4). This indicates Milton’s radical perspective on the role of government, and the justification for revolution against or rejection of authority that does not follow from reason. Adam’s lament in Book 10 “implicitly impugns dynastic kingship by demonstrating through Adam’s example that bloodline, birthright, and other organic measures of patriarchal entitlement suppress free will and enslave the spirit” and has “anti-dynastic implications” (Turbowitz 400). Raphael’s prophecy to Adam suggests that good earthly regimes are those which are directed by divine reason, and which allow for freedom. “The poet’s antipathy to dynasty kingship and its organic measures of personal entitlement and social belonging require him to repudiate the body and traditional body politic, and to revalue personal and collective identity” (389).
Some scholars argue that Milton’s reformation of theology and politics is based on an integration of body and spirit, or materialist monism. “Milton wants and needs to integrate spirit and body, but also to separate them. This paradox is intrinsically related to his opposition to dynastic kingship and to his protomodern vision of the reformed nation” (389).
In a political tract, Milton wrote:
Man is a living being, intrinsically and properly one and individual. He is not double or separable: not, as is commonly thought, produced from and composed of two distinct and different elements, soul and body. On the contrary, the whole man is soul, and the soul man: a body, in other words, or individual substance: animated, sensitive, and rational (Complete Prose Works, 6: 318).
Monism, Lewalski argues, “underlies the epic’s blurred distinctions between matter and spirit, angels and humans, intuitive and discursive intellect” (149). It reinvents the connection between the corporeal form of God’s creation, and the metaphysical part which scripture calls the ‘soul’. Milton describes God as the “Author of all being” (3. 374). To choose existence under God’s terms, to be what the supreme ruler deemed seemly, is to choose eternal blessing. Conversely, “to reject God is to reject being” (Moore, lecture). The Hell of Paradise Lost is unique as a result of this argument; “in contrast to traditional portrayals of hell, the hell of Paradise Lost is characterized by silence and absence” (Diekhoff 59). Hell is the inverted goodness of God’s creation. It is Satan, who says “which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell” (Milton 4.75). The most corrupt political regime is one in which God’s order is dissolved: ‘nonbeing’, as it were.
Milton demonstrates the enactment of the divine regime on earth through the relationship of Adam to Eve, and their subsequent offspring. Eve’s role is a controversial one, as some scholars argue that she is a subordinate within a traditional patriarchal regime, while others find grounds for feminism in Milton’s treatment of humanity’s mother. According to Elisabeth Liebert, Eve is “subordinate and privilegedsimultaneously, at once liberator by Milton’s revision of tradition and proscribed by the limitations of that revision” (152). Adam is immediately defined in relation to reason, which, considering the importance of reason as the foundation of authority and liberty (as discussed earlier), suggests that Adam is the intrinsically superior being. “When Adam is first introduced to the reader in Book 4, he already possesses an authoritative and well-reasoned knowledge of himself and of God” (Liebert 152). Only Adam experiences direct discourse with God, and he alone receives the divine prophecy. Yet even though God deprives Eve of these privileges, it is “evident in her changing discourse as she adjusts the mode of her address to Adam, [that] she is already identifying knowledge and its dissemination as a powerful tool in the creation and dissolution of hierarchy” (162). Liebert notes that Milton’s Eve considers retaining sole possession of the knowledge granted by the tree, to “render [her] more equal, and perhaps, / A thing not undesirable, sometime / Superior” (Milton 9.823-25). Eve is paradoxically liberated and enslaved by her actions, and her role in the patriarchal society of God and Adam takes on new importance with unique implications. Milton grants Eve a particular understanding of the world, suggesting a new sort of equality, but ultimately places her in subjection to both the will of God and of Adam. This reestablishment of patriarchal rule is an indication that God’s monarchy, when replicated on Earth, has man at its head. Yet it also requires Adam’s unity with a capable and rational female, and the freedom of all members of civilization.
Jesus, the redeemer and intercessor for the sins of humanity, is the fulfillment of God’s grace and mercy. Raphael speaks of the sacrifice that will destroy Satan and overcome death in terms of obedience to the law: “The law of God exact he shall fulfill /

Both by obedience and by love, though love / Alone fulfill the law” (Milton 12.402-4). This suggests that it is the Son’s complete submission to his place in the Father’s plan that ultimately brings eternal justice into the kingdom of Heaven. Insofar as the Son fulfills all the duty prescribed to him by the Father, humanity is redeemed. “The poem depicts human nature as universally enslaved through the fall, but also as universally liberated through the operation of prevenient grace” (McColley 14), which is manifest in the Son. The actions of Adam and Eve ensnare all of humankind, but the poem offers a conception of God’s grace that acts as deliverance and benediction. Thus, even after the Fall, humankind, though bound by sin, can freely choose grace and be reconciled to the divine.
Politics and theology are both concerned with the governance of human desire and action. Milton, who introduces a unique conception of the divine, and a critical analysis of government, blends the two in compelling and controversial ways. Ultimately, for Milton, a just political regime is established on the principle of free will, which is informed by reason. Reason–to know and will the good–originates in the divine. Milton provides numerous political images in Paradise Lost which emphasize the connection between politics and theology. His exploration of free will, tyranny, materialist monism, and divine authorship shape both the political and theological arguments of the epic poem. In the end, humanity is redeemed, and God is supreme ruler of everything in Milton’s vast and infinitely complex universe.
Works Cited
Diekhoff, John S. Milton’s Paradise Lost: A Commentary on the Argument. New York: Columbia University Press. 1946.
Dobranski, Stephen B. and John P. Rumrich. Milton and Heresy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.
Donnelly, Phillip J. “ ‘Matter’ versus Body: The Character of Milton’s Monism”. Milton Quarterly. Vol. 33, No. 3 (October 1999): 79-85.
Dunnum, Eric. “The Bipartite System of Laws in Paradise Lost”. Rocky Mountain Review. Vol. 64, No. 2 (Fall 2010): 151-169. Print.
Fallon, Stephen. Milton among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in
Seventeenth-Century England. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Lewalski, Barbara K. “Forum: Milton’s Christian Doctrine”. Studies in English Literature. Houston, Texas: Rice University. 1992.
Liebert, Elisabeth. “Rendering ‘More Equal’: Eve’s Changing Discourse in ‘Paradise Lost’ ”. Milton Quarterly. (Vol. 37, Issue 3): 152-165.
Martin, Raymond and John Barresi. The Rise and Fall of Soul and self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity. New York: Columbia University Press. 2006.
McColley, Diane Kelsy. “All in All: The Individuality of Creatures in Paradise Lost”. All in All: Unity, Diversity and the Miltonic Perspective. Associated University Presses, Inc. 1999.
Milton, John. Paradise Lost. Ed. John Leonard. England: Penguin Classics. 2000.
Moore, Andrew. GRID 3506, Freedom. Holy Cross Room 5, St. Thomas University, Fredericton. October 2014.
Myers, Benjamin. Milton’s Theology of Freedom. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 2006
Savage, J.B. “Freedom and Necessity in Paradise Lost”. ELH. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 44, No.2, 1977.
Turbowitz, Rachel J. “Body Politics in Paradise Lost”. PMLA. Vol. 121, No. 2 (March 2006), 388-404. Modern Languages Association.

America, Oil, and War in the Middle East

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.—Jimmy Carter, state of the union address, Jan. 23, 1980

Middle Eastern oil has enchanted global powers and global capital since the early twentieth century. Its allure has been particularly powerful for the United States. The American romance began in earnest in the 1930s, when geologists working for Standard Oil of California discovered commercial quantities of oil on the eastern shores of Saudi Arabia. In the years that followed, enchantment turned into obsession. Shortly after World War II it became clear that oil was more than merely a coveted industrial commodity. The most visible and celebrated event in that history occurred when Franklin D. Roosevelt hosted ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud, the founding monarch of Saudi Arabia, aboard the USS Quincy on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake in February 1945. The meeting permanently linked Middle Eastern oil with American national security. It also helped forge one of the twentieth century’s most important strategic relationships, in which the Saudis would supply cheap oil to global markets in exchange for American protection. A bargain was made. And so too was a future tinderbox.1

Over the course of the twentieth century, preserving the security not just of Saudi Arabia but of the entire Persian Gulf region and the flow of Middle Eastern oil were among the United States’ chief political-economic concerns.2 The pursuit of American power in the Gulf has been fraught with peril and has proved costly in terms of both blood and treasure. Oil has flowed, although not without difficulty. Since the late 1970s the Gulf has been rocked by revolution and almost permanent war. Security, if measured by the absence of conflict, has been elusive, and safeguarding the Persian Gulf and the region’s oil producers has meant increasingly more direct and dearer forms of U.S. intervention.

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the American military occupation there represented only the latest stage of American militarism in the Middle East. While more considerable in scale, duration, and devastation than previous military misadventures in the region, the Iraq War was the outgrowth of several decades of strategic thinking and policy making about oil. It is true, of course, that terrorism and especially the attacks of September 11, 2001, helped accelerate the drive to war in 2003, but to focus too much on 9/11 is to overlook and discount the ways that oil and oil producers have long been militarized, the role oil has played in regional confrontation for almost four decades, and the connections between the most recent confrontation with Iraq and those of the past.3 Oil and war have become increasingly interconnected in the Middle East. Indeed, that relationship has become a seemingly permanent one. This outcome was not inevitable; the United States has not only been mired in the middle, but its approach to oil has also abetted the outcome.

It is also important to understand the U.S. emphasis on security, and the contradictions of its approach to it, in a broader regional context. While this essay does not dwell on the U.S.-Israeli relationship, U.S. Persian Gulf policy and America’s relationship with the region’s oil producers were often at odds with the alliance between the United States and Israel. The tensions created by American policies in the Gulf have undermined U.S. claims about pursuing regional security more generally. This contradiction played out most spectacularly during the 1973 oil crisis.4

The Strategic Logic of Militarism

The United States is not the only Western power with a history of war in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. In a rush to secure and expand their own supplies in the region, the British landed an expeditionary force near Basra in what is now Iraq in 1914. By 1918 the British captured Baghdad and ensconced themselves and their allies there, a perch from which they projected power for several decades.5 American ascendance in the Persian Gulf later in the century created a new pattern of militarism and war. Unlike its predecessors, the United States did not wage war out of old-fashioned imperial calculation or ambition. American oil wars have not been about establishing direct control over oil fields nor about liberation or freedom, at least not political freedom for the peoples of the region. Instead, they have primarily been about protecting friendly oil producers. The objective has not necessarily been to guarantee that Middle Eastern oil made its way to the United States, although meeting basic domestic energy needs remained a vital part of the broader calculation. Keeping prices stable (not low) and keeping pro-American regimes in power were central to U.S. strategic policy.

The pattern of militarism that began in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s has partly been the product of American support for and deliberate militarization of brutal and vulnerable authoritarian regimes. Massive weapons sales to oil autocrats and the decision to build a geopolitical military order in the Gulf that depended on and empowered those rulers resulted in a highly militarized and fragile balance of power. And from the 1970s on, oil-producing states have faced repeated internal and external threats, including domestic unrest, invasion, and regional or civil war, or at least the imminent prospect of turmoil. Such instability and conflict has had much to do, of course, with internal political problems, only some of which were the result of outside intervention. But the militarization that began in earnest under the United States’ watch exacerbated and accelerated those uncertainties and helped further destabilize oil-producing states and the region.

The approach of the United States to oil and the Persian Gulf in the late twentieth century was both a sign of its superpower status and a demonstration of its limits. What began as an effort to build up and empower surrogates, client states in the Gulf that would do the bidding of the United States, proved instead to be the gateway for more direct projections of American military power. Jimmy Carter’s warning during his 1980 state of the union address that the United States would use “any means necessary, including military force” to safeguard its “vital interests” in the Gulf has clearly come to pass.6

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the transformative period in the United States’ approach to security and militarism in the Persian Gulf. In January 1968 the British government announced that it would end its longtime imperial presence in the region and withdraw its political and military resources. The move unsettled American policy makers anxious about a potential power vacuum. Other pressures also began to mount. In the decade leading up to the British announcement, governments of oil-producing countries had already begun to bristle against the dominating and unfair practices of the major oil companies, which had exercised monopolistic control over the means of production and pricing for much of the twentieth century. In 1960 several major oil producers established the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in a gambit to drive prices higher. OPEC achieved little in its early years. The assertiveness of the oil producers would grow by the 1970s, however, as major producers began to nationalize the operations of the oil companies.7

More importantly, contradictions in America’s Middle East security strategy would challenge the nation’s efforts to maintain friendly relations with the region’s oil producers. Historically, the United States struggled to balance its support for Israel with its support for the region’s oil producers, who had long considered the Israel-friendly foreign policy of the United States as an irritant. In 1973 this irritation transformed into outrage during the October War, when Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces to recapture territory in the Sinai Peninsula. Gulf oil producers were infuriated when the United States helped re-equip the beleaguered Israeli military in the course of battle. Led by Saudi Arabia, Arab oil producers and oil companies orchestrated an embargo of the United States, thereby drying up supply and driving up prices. As a result of the 1973 crisis, the oil-producing countries finally seized direct control over production and pricing mechanisms from the giant Western oil conglomerates, leading to a massive increase in oil revenues for those nations. The embargo and its impact on domestic politics troubled American officials, who struggled to rebuild relations with oil-producing allies. But the anxieties generated by the contradictions of U.S. policies on Israel and oil did not lead to a reconsideration of U.S. regional security policy. Rather, the United States deepened its commitment to the regional order.8

In fact, after the initial shock of the embargo, the rapid spike in prices did not overly trouble American policy makers, who worked to convince leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and elsewhere in the Gulf to reinvest the revenues they were generating from the skyrocketing price of oil in the West by spending some of their newfound wealth on Western products and, most importantly, American weapons. The creation of a weapons pipeline deepened the ties between the United States and Gulf oil producers, but the waves of nationalization did help dismantle a geopolitical framework that had served American oil interests in the past. In that system Western oil companies, in cooperation with their home governments, exercised direct control over Middle Eastern oil. The relationships between these companies and the oil-producer governments were periodically tempestuous, but they were mostly cooperative. Governments of the region fought to achieve a modicum of equity in profit sharing from the sale of oil, but they remained almost entirely beholden to the companies for the extraction, refining, distribution, and sale of petroleum. It was an arrangement that enjoyed the full support of the U.S. government. Companies such as Aramco that operated in Saudi Arabia not only cooperated closely with the U.S. government, but they also often had members of the American political and intelligence communities on their payrolls.9

The convergence of corporate and political interests around oil had profound consequences on the character of political authority in and around the region. The companies helped forge and defend a set of relationships with Arab autocrats that American leaders since Roosevelt have considered vital to the stability of the region. The United States demonstrated its preference for autocrats in 1953, when the Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated a coup to overthrow Mohammed Mossadeq, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, and bring back Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi as ruler. The oil companies did their part to strengthen authoritarians elsewhere in the region. During the 1950s and 1960s U.S. government officials and oil-company executives feared the potential power of Arab nationalists and the possibility that they might nationalize Arab oil and refuse to supplicate to American and Western interests. The companies and the U.S. government considered the possibility of such a scenario a threat to U.S. Cold War and material interests in the Persian Gulf.10

Although direct corporate and U.S. political control over Persian Gulf oil ended in the 1970s, the authoritarian regimes remained. The U.S. government sought to do new kinds of business with them, by arming them and positioning them as surrogates for American interests and power. Richard M. Nixon provided the impetus for the new militarization strategy in 1969 when he articulated a new strategic doctrine. Under pressure to guide the United States out of the quagmire in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine called on American allies to bear a greater burden in providing for their own defense. U.S. policy makers observed the doctrine in the Gulf by keeping American military forces “over the horizon.” Without the British present to preserve the Gulf’s balance of power, the United States moved to build up local militaries to maintain regional order. The American government focused primarily on strengthening Iran and Saudi Arabia, propping them up as the twin pillars of the United States’ new regional geopolitical strategy. Between 1970 and 1979 the United States committed to over $22 billion in arms sales to Iran, accounting for roughly three-quarters of all of Iran’s weapons purchases during the decade. Sales commitments to Saudi Arabia were more modest, at just under $3.5 billion for the decade, still a significant amount considering that the United States only started selling weapons to the kingdom in 1972.11

The Perils of Militarization

The consequences of the new militarization policy were considerable. Although the policies were not immediately destabilizing, they did help lay the foundation for the era of violence and insecurity that followed. As militarization became a regional phenomenon, it also emboldened Gulf dictators, who became increasingly assertive and threatening to one another. Rising tensions in the Gulf, most notably between Iran and Iraq, were the result of complicated domestic and regional politics. However, embattled Gulf state leaders sought security through the purchase of billions of dollars worth of weapons, which the American government and the American weapons industry were happy to provide. The result was further massive militarization of the region and a boon for the military-industrial complex. By the end of the decade the largest oil producers in the Gulf were in a full-blown arms race. The Soviet Union pitched in by committing to sell over $10 billion in weapons to Iraq, its main client in the region and the principal rival to Iran. But it was the United States that did the most to facilitate the militarization of the region. Between 1975 and 1979 Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia purchased 56 percent of all the weapons sold in the Middle East and made almost one-quarter of all global arms purchases. Lee Hamilton, a leading Democratic congressman, warned in a 1973 statement on the floor of Congress about the potentially excessive nature of arms sales to the region. He remarked that “the net impression left … is that we are willing to sell just about everything these Persian Gulf states want and will buy.” And buy they did. Iran proved particularly keen to acquire as much high-tech military weaponry as possible. The shah purchased the newest weapons systems available from American manufacturers, including seventy-nine F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, the U.S. Navy’s premier fighter, in 1974.12 By the middle of the 1970s, the American notion of security in the Persian Gulf was based almost entirely on the ability of oil producers to purchase the machines of war.

The militarization of the Persian Gulf exacerbated existing instabilities and hastened an era of regional conflict. During the heyday of arms sales, some U.S. officials and elected representatives grew alarmed. Throughout the 1970s and into the following decade, members of Congress convened regular meetings to flesh out the potential harm of massive militarization in the Gulf. Much of the concern centered on the potential threat that newly armed Arab oil producers posed to Israel. Hamilton cautioned that “the appropriate area for justifiable concerns is in the general policy of pouring lots of sophisticated arms in an extremely volatile portion of the Middle East, known not for exemplary regional cooperation, but instead for a plethora of territorial, ethnic, familial and political disputes over the last several hundred years.”13

Although others shared Hamilton’s anxieties, those responsible for overseeing U.S. policy in the Gulf dismissed those concerns. The warnings expressed by Hamilton and others should have prompted caution, but few policy makers or arms manufacturers were inclined to question the stability of authoritarian regimes that had been longtime allies. Especially after the first oil boom, Gulf oil states seemed even more in command than before. Flush with billions of dollars in new oil revenues by the mid-1970s, the Gulf oil producers went on a decade-long domestic spending spree, throwing money at a range of social, economic, and potential political problems. Regimes in the region committed billions of dollars to modernization and development programs and to the expansion of cradle-to-grave social services.14

The intent of that spending was to redistribute oil wealth as a means to stave off potential restiveness. And the potential for unrest was considerable. Most of the Gulf’s autocrats came to power through conquest, alliances with imperial powers, or both. The preferred clients of the United States, the rulers of Iran and Saudi Arabia, used a combination of coercion and co-option to establish and then maintain their power. But even after decades of rule, neither regime possessed much credibility or legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. Significant domestic political fault lines were evident in each country. Although most Saudi Arabians and Iranians embraced the new wealth and the services it provided, many continued to bristle against the practices of their rulers. Both regimes assumed that the widespread redistribution of wealth would placate whatever simmering hostilities lurked beneath the surface of Saudi Arabian and Iranian society. Neither engaged in any significant reform or allowed for a greater role for their citizens in government. Saudi Arabia, with a smaller population, became less coercive, although the threat of regime violence was omnipresent. In contrast, the shah in Iran remained a brutal and cruel tyrant. Martin Ennals, the secretary general of Amnesty International, remarked in 1977 that Iran has the “highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran.”15 Leaders in both countries proceeded as though the spike in oil revenues and their new spending power had allowed them to renew autocracy at home. Their social programs were meant to establish a new deal with the governed, one in which the state redistributed wealth in exchange for complete political quiescence. Many inside and outside Iran and Saudi Arabia assumed that the new social contract and the influx of oil revenues had strengthened the regimes.

In neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran did the bargain hold up. Rather than emerge from the oil boom stronger, both regimes proved vulnerable to significant domestic pressures by the end of the 1970s. Saudi Arabia faced two episodes of unrest in November 1979. In the kingdom’s Eastern Province, tens of thousands of Shi ites rebelled against Saudi rule and especially against their status as second-class citizens. Simultaneously, but in an unrelated event, hundreds of rebels seized and occupied the Mecca Grand Mosque. The rebels, who denounced the Al Saud ruling family as illegitimate rulers, held the mosque for two weeks before being rooted out by a combination of Saudi and French special forces.16

It was the oil-fueled authoritarianism in Iran, however, that proved most vulnerable. Iranian revolutionaries tossed the shah from power in 1979.17 The fall of the shah, considered unthinkable by American officials just a few years before, demolished the twin-pillar policy. From the perspective of American policy makers, the revolution radically transformed the balance of power in the region, turning Iran from America’s strategic ally to a menacing rival. Whatever the reality of Iran’s new position in the region, the revolution brought to a dramatic conclusion U.S. reliance on highly militarized local powers as defenders of the Gulf’s regional order. While they would continue to encourage and oversee the militarization of Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers in the 1980s and beyond, American leaders lost faith in the idea that local surrogates possessed the political capacity to safeguard U.S. interests. Anxieties that Middle Eastern oil was vulnerable to new Cold War developments also deepened shortly after the fall of the shah, which accelerated the transformation of how the United States would project its power in the region. In December 1979 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Carter to make clear America’s deep attachment to the Persian Gulf and U.S. willingness to use militarily force to protect the flow of oil. Even after Carter mapped out a new strategic/military vision for the region, it would not be fully realized for a few years. Nevertheless, it was here that the era of direct American intervention in the Persian Gulf began.

The Long War

The Iranian Revolution not only helped transform the regional order and reshape American policy but it also helped unleash many of the destructive forces that have plagued the Persian Gulf ever since. In September 1980, sensing weakness in Iran and concerned about potential domestic challenges to his power, Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi army to launch an invasion of Iranian oil facilities. Fighting between Iran and Iraq persisted until 1988, with hundreds of thousands killed and wounded. The Persian Gulf has been virtually engulfed in war ever since. Of course, American oil policy was not directly responsible for Hussein’s decision to invade Iran. Hussein perceived himself to be beset by a number of domestic and regional challenges that he believed war would resolve.18 The considerations that led him down this path were partly pathological, but they were also shaped by the militarization of oil and the region in the previous decade. This intense militarization, the politics of the region’s arms race, and the combination of the increasing boldness of regional powers and their growing paranoia about one another were central to Hussein’s calculus for war.

While the United States claimed to have been caught off guard by Iraq’s invasion of Iran, many U.S. policy makers came to see a continuation of the war as a useful way to bog down two of the region’s most highly militarized regimes and to stave off short-term threats to the regional order and the political economy of oil. To this end, the United States supplied weapons, funding, and intelligence to both sides in the conflict, and acknowledged and condoned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and against its own citizens.19 The decision to view the Iran-Iraq War as a useful conflict, one worth abetting as a means to contain the belligerents and therefore ensure security elsewhere in the Gulf, proved to be a dangerous gambit. Ultimately, that decision would result in the realization of the Carter Doctrine and the direct intervention of the United States in Persian Gulf conflict. And it was the threat to oil shipping that finally brought the American military in to stay.

In 1986 Kuwait requested protection from both the United States and the Soviet Union from Iranian attacks on its oil tankers. The following March the United States obliged by allowing Kuwaiti tankers to fly the U.S. flag, thereby rendering attacks on tankers as attacks on American interests, and by dispatching a large naval fleet to provide direct protection. American and Iranian military forces exchanged fire on several occasions in 1987. Hostilities escalated in 1988, with the United States sinking several Iranian warships and damaging oil platforms. That summer the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger jet, killing all 290 civilians on board. The incident was a stunning blow to Iran, and one that effectively sapped its will to fight further.20 That the United States became an active participant in the Iran-Iraq War, taking and causing casualties, is hardly a secret. Yet it has not been featured in considerations of the patterns of American engagement in the region or in its history of militarism in the Gulf. It should be. The war intensified American and Arab anxieties about Iranian power and ambition, worries that began with the 1979 revolution. Iran’s status as one of the region’s principal bogeymen and “rogue” states has endured and continues today to be one of the primary and repeated justifications for a continued American military presence in the region.

American involvement in and efforts to protract the Iran-Iraq War also shaped future conflict with Iraq. Although Iraq received substantial military, technical, and financial assistance from the United States and its Arab neighbors during the war, it emerged from the conflict mired in debt and deeply shaken. Although encouraged by its allies and its patrons to drag out the war, Iraq could not afford it. Hussein borrowed heavily from neighboring oil states to fund his war machine. Unable to pay its debts or to stimulate its economy after the war, Iraq faced domestic disaster. Saddam Hussein urgently sought a remedy, knowing that his power would be imperiled if he proved unable to steward Iraq back to the path of reasonable prosperity. Reestablishing its oil industry and resecuring a share of the global oil market might have provided Iraq a way out of indebtedness, but Iraq’s oil-producing neighbors were not sympathetic. Arab lenders demanded that Iraq repay its war debts. Meanwhile, several of Iraq’s neighbors, including Kuwait, were dumping excess oil onto the market, which had the effect of driving prices down, limiting Iraqi revenues, and constraining its potential recovery.21

The anxieties, traumas, and hypermilitarism that precipitated Iran’s revolution, Iraq’s invasion, and the escalation of regional insecurity in the 1980s persisted. After two years of pleading and saber rattling, Saddam Hussein once again pursued a military solution, invading Kuwait in August 1990 and precipitating an even more dramatic escalation of American military intervention in the Gulf. Much of the history of Operation Desert Storm and the 1990s sanctions regime are well known. Alarmed by the potential fallout of Iraq possessing not only Kuwaiti oil but also Saudi Arabian oil led the United States to mobilize more than five hundred thousand troops in its largest war effort since the Vietnam War. In just a few days the U.S.-led coalition drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In the decade that followed the United States oversaw a devastating sanctions regime that eviscerated Iraq’s society and economy. The official American policy immediately after the war was one of containing both Iraq and Iran—keeping the region’s “rogue” states from threatening the other oil producers. By the end of the 1990s, however, containment had given way to a policy of regime change, the high-water mark of direct American militarism in the region, in which the U.S. government began actively to pursue the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Even the sanctions regime, which was officially rationalized as a system designed to ensure that Iraq abandon its weapons of mass destruction program, functioned instead as an extension of the policy of regime change, which was realized with the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.22

Capturing oil and oil fields and establishing direct or imperial control over oil has not been part of the United States’ strategic logic for war. But protecting oil, oil producers, and the flow of oil has been. This is a critical distinction. The period between 1990 and the end of the long war in Iraq marks only the latest stage of American militarism in the Gulf. If oil and American oil policy—rather than the behavior of Saddam Hussein, the politics of the war on terrorism, or a handful of other political factors—are kept in focus, then one can argue that this period constitutes not a series of wars, but a single long war, one in which pursuing regional security and protecting oil and American-friendly oil producers has been the principal strategic rationale. That the permanent shadow of war has settled over the Persian Gulf in the last three decades is largely the direct outcome of the ways that oil has been tied to American national security and the ways that American policy makers linked security to militarization.

An Elusive Security

It might be tempting to argue that the escalating involvement of the United States and its history of militarism and military engagement in the Gulf region have provided a kind of security for the region. After all, oil has continued to flow, the network of oil producers has remained the same, and thus the primary interests of the United States in the region have been served. But three decades of war belie this argument. War is not tantamount to security, stability, or peace. Even in the periods between wars in the region the violence carried out by regimes against their own subjects makes clear that peace is not always peaceful. The cost has been high for the United States and especially for people who live in the Middle East. In thirty years of war, hundreds of thousands have died excruciating and violent deaths. Poverty, environmental disaster, torture, and wretched living conditions haunt the lives of many in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere in the region. Of course, the burden of death and destruction does not fall entirely on the United States and its policy of militarization. The politics of war have primarily served the interests of regional leaders who have, often from a position of weakness, exported violence to deflect internal challenges to their authority. And international political rivalry, particularly during the Cold War, drew in the other global powers, most notably the Soviet Union, which also helped facilitate insecurity and disorder in the Middle East.

The region’s autocrats have also remained in power. As citizens began to challenge ruling regimes in early 2011 in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman—three of the closest allies of the United States in the region—it became clear that those governments are all too willing to turn the weapons of war, purchased mostly from the United States, on their subjects. It is also clear that those regimes are hardly stable and that they are and will remain perennially vulnerable to domestic and regional shocks, which poses a real dilemma for U.S. policy. In addition to factoring in the human toll of wars and the moral dilemmas they raise, Americans trying to determine the true price of oil in the United States must take into account the financial cost of maintaining a massive military presence in the Gulf region. Roger Stern estimates that between 1976 and 2007 the total cost of maintaining the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf was about $7 trillion, and that figure does not include the costs of the 2003 Iraq War.23

The increasing willingness of the United States to use force and violence to shore up the flow of oil to global markets has not been a sign of American strength but rather of its limits. Popular political discourse in the United States often posits Americans and their government as unwitting victims of an unhealthy and unsustainable addiction or as dupes of duplicitous oil producers. It would certainly be wise to break this addiction to oil, but to do so requires coming to terms with the history of that addiction and the multiple costs it entails. But it is hardly clear that any such reconsideration is happening. Instead, the United States appears set to continue along a familiar path. Having crafted a set of relationships with oil and unstable oil producers and having linked the fate of those relationships to American national security virtually ensures that while the United States is wrapping up the most recent oil war, its military and political strategists are already preparing for the next one.


He is grateful to Vishal Kamath, Matthew Oliveri, Courtney Shaw, Justin Stearns, Chris Toensing, Robert Vitalis, Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicut, and the JAH referees for their criticisms and suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay


  • 1 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York, 2008), 385–86; Lloyd C. Gardner, Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II (New York, 2009), 19–25.

  • 2 For an alternative take on the political economy of oil and the need to protect supply, see Timothy Mitchell, “McJihad: Islam in the U.S. Global Order,” Social Text, 20 (Winter 2002), 5. Timothy Mitchell notes that “contrary to popular belief, there is too much [oil]. Oil is the world’s second most abundant fluid, so any producer is always at risk of being undercut by another. If all one wanted was a market in oil to supply those who need it, this would pose no problem. But the oil industry is about profits, not markets, and large profits are impossible to sustain under such competitive conditions. The potential rents—or ‘premiums on scarcity,’ as they are called—could be realized only if mechanisms were put in place to create the scarcity.” See ibid.

  • 3 Sheila Carapico and Chris Toensing wrote in 2006 that “to hear American politicians and the commercial news media tell it, the greatest military power in world history hastily launched an ill-conceived invasion because of intelligence failures and wishful fantasies of sweets and flowers. It is as if, to paraphrase a sentiment heard in White House hallways on September 11, 2001, history really did start on that day, and nothing that happened beforehand mattered. It is as if the United States had never articulated a global vision of ‘full-spectrum dominance,’ acted upon hegemonic ambitions in the Persian Gulf or planned for forcible ‘regime change’ in Iraq.” See Sheila Carapico and Chris Toensing, “The Strategic Logic of the Iraq Blunder,” Middle East Report (no. 239, Summer 2006), 6–11, esp. 6. For the best account emphasizing the role of 9/11 in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, see F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf  (New York, 2010), 184–97.

  • 4 On the tensions between U.S. policies regarding Israel and oil, see Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicut, “The End of the Concessionary Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958–1972” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2011).

  • 5 On Iraq and the British role there see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (New York, 2000), 30–147; Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers (Princeton, 1978); Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley, 2005); Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: A History of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York, 2003); and Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (New York, 2008).

  • 6 On the Carter Doctrine, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York, 1983).

  • 7 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, 1988), 134. On the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), see Yergin, Prize; and Leonardo Magueri, The Age of Oil: What They Don’t Want You to Know about the World’s Most Controversial Resource (Westport, 2006), 93–102.

  • 8 Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York, 1975). See also James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York, 2011). Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East (New York, 2011).

  • 9 On the efforts of American policy makers to convince leaders to reinvest revenues from oil sales to the West, see Cooper, Oil Kings. Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Palo Alto, 2007). Aramco was the name for the Arabian American Oil Company, a consortium established by the U.S.-based oil giants Chevron, Texaco, Exxon, and Mobil. Aramco operated under their ownership until 1980, when it was fully nationalized by Saudi Arabia.

  • 10 On the role of U.S. experts in strengthening the grip of the Saudi royal family over its territory and resources in the twentieth century, see Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Mass., 2010). Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19 (Aug. 1987), 261–86. Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saūd, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations (Bloomington, 2002).

  • 11 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill, 2002). On the United States and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, see Safran, Saudi Arabia, 180–214. The dollar figures are drawn from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database at and are presented using SIPRI’s online trend indicator values (TIVs) expressed in U.S. dollar amounts at constant 1990 prices. For an explanation of SIPRI’s arms transfer tables, see “Explanation of the TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,

  • 12 SIPRI Trend Indicator Values Database, Gause, International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 33. Statement by Lee Hamilton on “Arms Policy in Persian Gulf Area,” May 31, 1973, in New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, 1973 (Washington, 1973), 191. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database and SIPRI Trade Register Database, The original sale of the F-14 Tomcats was for eighty planes. Seventy-nine were delivered between 1976 and 1978, with the United States quarantining one after the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution.

  • 13 Hamilton, “U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” in New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, 192.

  • 14 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, 2010), 41–142; Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform (New York, 2003), 76–215; Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York, 2000), 401–35.

  • 15 On redistribution efforts in Saudi Arabia, see Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats; and Jones, Desert Kingdom, 1–19, 54–137. On Iran and reform, see Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, 2006), 132–69. Martin Ennals quoted in Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 13.

  • 16 Oil-producing states elsewhere were also vulnerable to domestic pressures. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states (Berkeley, 1997). Jones, Desert Kingdom, 138–78. Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39 (Feb. 2007), 103–22. On the 1979 Mecca Grand Mosque uprising, see Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam’s Holiest Shrine (New York, 2007).

  • 17 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), 419–529; Keddie, Modern Iran, 132–213.

  • 18 F. Gregory Gause III, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” Middle East Journal, 56 (Winter 2002), 47–70.

  • 19 Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York, 2007), 37–64.

  • 20 Gause, International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 81–85.

  • 21 On U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran in the 1990s, see ibid., 88–135. Tripp, History of Iraq, 248–53. Iraq’s neighbors dumped oil onto global spot markets and exceeded quotas set by OPEC not because they intended to harm Iraq directly; Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, the two states most responsible for overproducing oil, had economic reasons of their own to do so. Even so, Saddam Hussein saw their actions as acts of betrayal. See Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War,” 52–59.

  • 22 For a sober and devastating account of the politics of the sanctions regime, see Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Cambridge, Mass., 2010). See also Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (New York, 1999).

  • 23 Roger J. Stern, “United States Cost of Military Force Projection in the Persian Gulf, 1976–2007,” Energy Policy, 38 (June 2010), 2816–25.

Rivers in Andaman and Nicober Islands

The islands of Andaman and Nicobar are although much devoid of large river bodies but the scarcity there is fulfilled by the various perennial streams. Some of the perennial streams making a part of the Nicobar Islands are Mitakari, Pema Nala, Burma Nala, Protherropore Nala, Korang, Dhanikari, Karmatang, Rangat, Betapur, etc. On the other hand Andaman is blessed with just one river named as Kalpong.


The Great Nicobar Islands is known to be the only island on the Nicobar group which is having five perennial rivers. In the great Nicobar you can come across the rivers Alexandra, Amrit Kaur, Danes, Galathea and Dogmar and each of them has its origin in the Mount Thullier. Virtually, the rivers here flow in southern or southwesterly direction which is a clear indication that there is a general terrain slope across the island. Undulating hills which are spread throughout the island but the main range of it is running in south-north orientation. The highest part of this range, the mount Thuillier is considered to be the highest elevation among all the points in Nicobar. The area is 642 meters above the level of sea. The southernmost point here, known by the name of Indira point was submerged in tsunami waves in the year 2004.

Some of the major rivers making an important part of the topography of Andaman and Nicobar islands and also contributing to the daily trade of people in the region are listed below.

  • The Alexandria River making a major part of perennial rivers of the Great Nicobar is quiet popular in the region. This river is situated just at the mouth of Alexandria and is much known among the people for its leatherback nesting beaches scenically located on the Great Nicobar Island.
  • Another perennial river of the great Nicobar is the Galathea which flows over faulted anticline. It is basically the presence of a block faulting just at the downstream side of Galathea River. The beach close to it looks like it is meant for nesting of Giant Leather Black Turtles.
  • Doyma is also counted as the major perennial river of the Great Nicobar which is also a clear ground for nesting of Leather Black Turtles. The nesting ground for the turtles is situated at the Doyma Rivers mouth.
  • Kalpong makes the most popular river of the Andaman District which has its origination from the Saddle Peak which takes it to the Bay of Bengal. Particularly this river is considered to the site of the very first hydroelectric project in the entire region of Andaman and Nicobar islands. The river traverses in Northward direction on the island and continues to stretch for a length of 35 Kilometers before joining the Aerial Bay Creek of the eastern coast close to Diligpur.

The given perennial rivers and streams soaking the area of Andaman and Nicobar islands are enough to cater the demands of the people of island. Although the network here is not very intense in terms of water bodies still a lot of commercial activities and daily needs are easily satisfied with the presence of the existing ones. In all the existing natural resources of the island are enough to satisfy the needs as well as the embellishing of the island.



Trovants: The Growing Stones of Romania

You might have raised an eyebrow after reading the title, but nature is happy to confirm this fact and guarantees to give you the weirdest things in life as always. Trovants are extraordinary rocks that grow and multiply and you can witness these rocks in Romania.

The growing stones of Romania, Trovants, aren’t just unique because of its ability to multiply. These rocks are composed mainly by a hard stone core and the rest is made up of sand which forms around the core as its shell. Trovants can only be made by highly-porous sand accumulations and sandstone deposits that are cemented by waters rich in calcium carbonate. The name “Trovant” (trovanti) was made and introduced by the naturalist Gh. M. Murgoci in his work “The Tertiary in Oltenia”.

troHeading straight to the question: What makes these rocks multiply? As you’ve read before, any form of water rich in calcium carbonate is essential in forming a Trovant, and that is also the key to make the rock grow in the presence of rainwater. After every heavy rain shower, Trovants absorb the rain’s minerals. The minerals are combined with the chemicals already present in the stone that later creates a reaction and pressure inside. The pressure spontaneously makes the rock grow from the center to its margins and multiply, with a deposition rate of about 4-5 cm in 1000 years.

trovants 1

trovants 2

Trovants usually appear with smooth and edgeless shapes. Cylindrical, nodular, and spherical; Trovants develop these inconsistent shapes as they grow and multiply due to irregular cement secretion. You can see these formations grow from a few millimeters, or to as large as 10 meters.


Trovants aren’t only strange due to their structure and ability to grow and multiply. They can also move from one place to another. Other than that, they also have root-like extensions and age rings visible when you cut the stone, but scientists have yet to find out an explanation to these unique features.

These rocks came into existence because of the earthquakes which occurred six million years ago. The sand reservoir was created after the successive sedimentation of the detritic material transported by the rivers.

trovants3If you want to see these rocks up-close then head right away to Romania’s Valcea County. You can either go at a sand quarry nearby Costeşti village, or along a river in Gresarea Brook nearby Oteşani village, approximately 15 km from Horezu. You can also see Trovants at the “Trovants Museum” Natural Reserve run by the Kogayon association which aims to raise awareness about protecting the environment. This museum located inside Costeşti village is protected by the UNESCO.

With combined characteristics of a plant and a rock, it’s confusing if these Trovants should be categorized as a living or a non-living creature. But whether it’s alive or not, these growing stones are surely interesting to see, touch and use. Besides its popular use as a building material for tombstones, locals also use these in making souvenirs.

Not only in Romania, you also see the growing stones in Russia, the steppes of Kazakhstan, Czech Republic, and other places.

Sub – Conscious

Deep inside my mind u tried to subdue me
Drenched your soul deep in my heart as if u knew me.
Trynna play with my life to make me believe that u owe me.
Figuring out, I’m sick of u, u tried to destroy me.

I ain’t crazy about u anymore
Bitch u dragged me to hell u bloody whore.
U tried to strangle me and break me apart into pieces,
Damn I should have listened to the words of holy Jesus.

Deep inside my mind I could listen to the tolling of the bell
My subconscious got drowned in hatred well.
I got lost in an echo whenever I heard your name.
Got blinded by the lies while seeking for fame.
Never could have imagined the girl I love would play such a game
Did everything right but still on me u did put the blame,
I used to believe u were a beautiful gem.
My subconscious got lost in the darkness; I couldn’t be the same again.

U hypnotized me with fake love
Came to me as a beautiful dove
Turned my mind into a unimaginable maze,
I could see nothing, everything was turning into haze

But through my subconscious I could see u were wearing a red dress,
My mind became void soon I started losing your trace.
Deep within me, I started looking for an answer
My subconscious mind forced me to dream about vengeance against her.

I could sense the earth shaking, ground breaking in a response to this disaster,
The entire story of my life turned into a nutshell of a struggling oyster.
I couldn’t take the pain any longer
My subconscious didn’t give up or surrender,
Anger raged in me and burned the grounds and transformed into hell
She was ravished by the amber and couldn’t leave anyone for this story to tell

It was her bell tolling now, a tyrant to my soul.
Never did I have ever imagined my mind could attain this goal.
Dream turned into reality and my sub conscious became someone’s disaster.
Like the Lannisters who couldn’t be on the throne and she was a daughter of a barrister.

The #epicfail of 2014: The year of Rahul in 5 key moments

Though there was not much to “celebrate,” the Congress celebrated its 130th Foundation Day on Sunday. Sometimes tradition demands you just have to keep a stiff upper lip and go through the motions. Except if you are Rahul Gandhi. Then apparently you don’t even need to do that.

While Sonia Gandhi unfurled the party flag, Rahul was missing in inaction. Was Rahul unwell? Out of the country? Did he forget to set his alarm clock? “None of the leaders could explain the reason for Rahul’s absence,” reports the Indian Express.

As Rajdeep Sardesai observes caustically in his India Today piece about Narendra Modi as the Newsmaker of 2014, that it can be said of Rahul that “he never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” That’s been Rahul’s signature move. During the furore after 2012 Delhi gang-rape, when he could have built his angry young citizen credentials, Rahul was nowhere to be found. He became the butt of aslogan instead – Saare yuva yahan hain, Rahul Gandhi kahan hai? (All the youngsters are here, where is Rahul Gandhi?)

Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi. PTI

Rahul’s problem is not that he lost an election. In elections someone wins, someone loses. What’s more devastating for the Congress is Rahul seems to have lost his way and is taking his party with it. The grand old party is continuing to shrink its way to the bottom, taking cold comfort in places like Jammu and Kashmir because the results were not as spectacularly bad as they could have been. It’s a party in search of a face saver these days and it is saddled with Rahul Gandhi who is not even around to provide that.

Here are the five key moments when Rahul Gandhi failed his party in 2014 in ways beyond leading it to an embarrassing 44 seats in the Lok Sabha.

When Rahul picked his metaphors Time Magazine once called Rahul Gandhi “long on metaphors, short on solutions.” The elephant, the beehive, the poisoned chalice, escape velocity, politics in your pant, poverty as a state of mind have all been glimpses into the mind of Rahul Gandhi and each one has left Indians more confused than before. In 2013 after listening to his speech at CII, Time’s Krista Mahr was struck by his plethora of platitudes cloaked in meandering metaphors:

Riffing off John F. Kennedy’s line that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” Gandhi said: “A rising tide doesn’t raise people who don’t have a boat. We have to help build the boat for them. It’s not good enough to raise the tide. We have to give them the basic infrastructure to rise with the tide.” It didn’t end there. A few minutes later, when talking about women in his constituency, he went on to say: “They told me they have no boats … They are not only building our boats, they are the waves.”

No wonder every Rahul speech on the 2014 campaign trail was keenly anticipated not for its heft or fire or vision but just for the entertainment of the spectacularly misfired metaphor.

When Rahul chose to stay anti-social In an election where young voters and first-time voters played a key role, Rahul, two decades younger than Narendra Modi, demonstrated he had little youth connect. As a CSDS poll showed, 42 percent of Indians in the age group 18-25 preferred Modi as their PM compared to 16 percent who preferred Rahul. While Modi wielded social media like a pro, even Instagramming these days, Rahul does not even have a Facebook or a Twitter account further reinforcing the image of a man who remains willfully out of touch. Rahul is photogenic and handsome but flops on television while Modi revels in it.

When Rahul spoke to Arnab With great fanfare Rahul decided to give the big interview to the hectoring Arnab Goswami to show to the world that he had real cojones. It flopped even though Goswami held his fire. The New York Times said ““Mr. Gandhi fumbled, stared with a blank expression and a tilted head and looked wounded at times.” The Indian Express listed eleven instances where he could have given better answers. And in most of them, when he was not being obtusely repetitive, he chose to talk about himself in the third person.

When Rahul didn’t come to dinner Say what you will about his legacy, Manmohan Singhlasted 10 years at the helm of the UPA. He deserved a dignified send-off. But while Sonia Gandhi presided over the farewell dinner, Rahul was a no show. “When (Rahul) is done, he goes back to his foreign home,” snickeredthe Shiv Sena’s Sanjay Raut. His absence was even more glaring given that the same Rahul had not that long ago publicly torn up an ordnance Manmohan Singh had signed. Rahul made no excuses, it was left to his red-faced party to mumble about vague “personal work”. “I feel there is no accountability in the party,” Rahul said as the Congress introspected after the election results were out, not realizing that accountability begins at home. Like showing up for dinner even when you don’t feel like it.

When Rahul smiled Rahul Gandhi’s nadir came not when the Congress lost but when he finally stepped forward, with his mother, in front of the cameras to accept that loss. A moment that should have been grim became all about grin instead as he beamed at the cameras.Faking News quipped that WhatsApp would introduce his mysterious grin as their latest smiley to be used to convey a SNAFU moment – Situation Normal All Fucked Up. “It was as if he was celebrating victory, not mourning Congress’ biggest rout in history,” wrote Abheek Barman in ET.

Perhaps he was thinking exactly reasoned some indefatigable well-wishers. “Now that the polls are over, he will completely unleash his plans,” a Congress source told the Mumbai Mirror. But after a flurry of media reports on how the Congress was going into reboot-and-rethink mode post the 2014 elections, the latest reports suggest that the Rahul reforms are being quietly buried by the Grand Old Party. CL Manoj writes in The Economic Timesthat Rahul’s pitch for “transparent party organizational elections through internal ballots” has been replaced by old-fashioned “maximum possible consensus.” The party has also done away with his push for holding primaries to select candidates and framing the party manifesto via street meetings. After electoral debacle after debacle, the party seems to have decided to focus on holding its beleaguered membership together instead of getting into bruising Old-guard vs New-guard battles.

Or is this the only way the Congress can quietly jettison the dead weight of its lightweight heir apparent despite the public protestations and prostrations of undying loyalty to the Gandhis?

Actually it does not seem that difficult to bypass Rahul. Rahul Gandhi has pushed for reform but never led that charge or stayed the course. Unlike a Narendra Modi who ruthlessly bent the BJP to his will and sidelined older stubborn leaders and challengers like a Sushma Swaraj, Rahul’s leadership style has always been fitful like a flickering tubelight. And that allows the entrenched Congressnetas to also drift back to business as usual because they can be sure that sooner or later Rahul-baba will go AWOL.

That does not mean they have a recipe to revive the Congress either with or without the Gandhis. Just as the BJP is on a winning streak, the Congress is on a losing streak, as state elections have demonstrated. No one wants to back a losing horse, even those nervous about handing the country over to one party’s whims.

But as Modi pushes for a Congress-muktBharat, the best New Year gift the Congress can hope for, as it licks it wounds at the end of 2014, is a Rahul-mukt Congress. 10 out of 7 Congressmen might even agree.